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(Of the power of the superior courts at common law.)

THE power of the superior courts to punish for contempt is, at
common law, unlimited, save by the definition of the term "contempt of court;" extending to everything so denominated, whether
in presence of the court or elsewhere, direct or constructive, and
including many offences not constituting contempt to an inferior
court. They can proceed summarily and of their own knowledge
to examine and punish contempts, or can issue an attachment,
either of their own motion or on that of parties interested: 4 Blk.
283; Rex v. Almon, Wilmot's Notes 243. But only courts of
record can issue an attachment: Comyn's Dig., Attachment, (A 1).
The exercise of this power lies solely in the discretion of the
judge, and will not be examined into by any other court: Rex v.
Clement, 4 B. & Ald. 218.
The question as to the existence and exercise of this power may
arise on a habeas corpus, a mandamus, a certiorari, and a writ of
error or appeal, also collaterally on a suit for damages or a prosecution against the person who has exercised it, and in England
on an application for remission of a fine.
Their power is also exclusive and independent of any other, nor
will it be reviewed or controlled by any other court by mandamus,
or on writ of error or appeal, certiorari, or habeas corpus. Nor is
it requisite that the cause of commitment be set forth in the
warrant, it is sufficient that the commitment be for contempt, for
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as regards superior courts the presumption omnia esse rite acta
always prevails concerning their proceedings, and that they have
Crosby's
jurisdiction: Regina v. Paty, 2 Ld. Raym. 1105; Brass
Bishop's
2
41;
Wheat.
7
Kearney,
Case, 3 Wilson 188; Exparte
Crim. Law, sect. 268; Ex parte Nugent, 1 Am. Law Jour. (N. S.)
107, 121; Carus Wilson's Case, 7 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 984; Yates's
Case, 4 Johns. 368; 9 Id. 395; State v. Tipton, 1 Blackf. 166;
Hunter v. State, 6 Ind. 423; Gist v. Bowman, 2 Bay 182; _Ez
parte Fernandez, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 3; Bac. Abr., Attach., 468;
In re Cohen, 5 Cal. 494, decided under the statutes of California;
Jordanv. State, 14 Texas 436; EEz parte Martin, 5 Yerg. 456.
Under the late code of Tennessee the law is otherwise: see Sanders
v. Metcalf, 1 Tenn. Chan. 419; Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss.
331; Clark v. People, Breese 266; Bickley v. Commonwealth, 2
J. J. Marshall 575; Johnston v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb 598; .Ex
parte Stickney, 40 Ala. 160; Shattuck v. State, 51 Miss. 50;
Ex parte Summers, 5 Ired. 149.
The judgments of superior courts are never void but only voidable
on plea or writ of error: 7 Bac. Abr. 67; 1 Chitty P1. 183; 2
Salk. 674; Kempe v. Kennedy, 5 Cr. 185; cited 10 Wheat. 199;
Walbridge v. Hall, 3 Vt. 119.
Of the jurisdiction of superior courts other courts take "judicial
notice." " Nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction
of a superior court except what expressly appears to be so:"
Peacock v. Bell, 1 Saund. 74; Bac. Abr., Courts, D, pl. 3; 6
East 600.
In England these principles have not always been fully established. When Lord COKE was chief justice, and great jealousy
existed between the courts of common law and chancery, the Court
of King's Bench in several instances bailed or discharged on habeas
corpus persons committed for contempt by the Court of Chancery,
See
but the practice was discontinued: 2 Hawk. 168, sect. 76.
(N.
B.
C.
10
the cases cited and discussed in -Exparte Fernandez,
S.) 3, and in Vaughan 139.
These efforts of Sir EDWARD COKE to control the Court of
as
Chancery, "are now universally admitted to have been illegal
well as rude and intemperate :" BLACK, J., in Passmore Williamson's Case, 26 Penn. St. 20. See also KENT, .C. J., in Yates's
Case, 4 Johns. 369.
The Court of King's Bench, in virtue of its "supreme control
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of all inferior courts," had the power to bail on habeas corpus in
cases of such commitment by all courts: 2 Hawk. 168, sect. 77 ;
but though it would do so in case of commitment by a mayor of a
town, justice of peace, or other inferior magistrate, where the
nature of the contempt is not shown, "yet it cannot be expected
that it will, with the like readiness," do this where there is "a
general commitment by a court of higher dignity, as of Oyer and
Terminer, or one of the courts of Westminster Hall."
In
Chkambers's Case, Cro. Car. 138, 168 (1627), who was committed
by a decree of the Court of Star Chamber for "insolent behavior
and words spoken at the council table," and brought before the
King's Bench on habeas corpus, the return was adjudged insufficient, the words not being mentioned, "so as the court might
adjudge of them," the prisoner was remanded and the warden
advised to amend his return. The prisoner was again brought up
under a rule of the court on the same habeas corpus, and the court
not having time to consider his case was. bailed to appear and be
of good behavior in the meantime. On appearance the amended
return set forth the "words of defamation of the government."
The prisoner prayed to be delivered, but was informed by "all the
court that to deliver one who was committed by the decree of one
of the courts of justice was not the usage of this court."
This case was cited and approved by Lord Chief Justice DE
GREY in the Lord Mlayor's Case, 3 Wilson 188 (1771), in the
Common Pleas, where he says: "The Courts of King's Bench or
Common Pleas never discharged any person committed for contempt, in not answering in the Court of Chancery if the return
was for a contempt." "If the Admiralty Court commits for
contempt this court never discharges the person committed." And
again (p. 198), "this is a writ by which the subject has a right to
the remedy of being discharged out of custody, if he hath been committed and is detained contrary to law; therefore the court must
consider, whether the authority committing, is a legal authority;
if the commitment is made by those who have authority to commit,
this court cannot discharge or bail the party committed, nor can
this court admit to bail one charged or committed in execution."
"Every court must be sole judge of its own contempts" (p. 201).
"When the House of Commons adjudge anything to be a contempt, their adjudication is a conviction, and their commitment in
consequence is execution; and the court cannot discharge or bail a
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person that is in execution by the judgment of any other court,"
and this court, "can do nothing when a person is in execution, by
the judgment of a court having competent jurisdiction; in such
case this court is not a court of appeal" (p. 199).
In the same case BLACKSTONE. J., says (p. 204) ; "All courts,
by which I mean to include the houses of parliament and the
courts of Westminster Hall, can have no control in matters of contempt. The sole adjudication of contempt, and the punishment
thereof in any manner, belongs exclusively, and without interference to each respective court. Infinite confusion would follow,
if courts could by writs of habeas corpus, examine and determine
the contempts of others, for if they have power to decide they
ought to have power to punish; no other court shall scan the judgment of a superior court, or the principal seat of justice."
This case was a habeas corpus in the Common Pleas on behalf
of Brass Crosby, Lord Mayor of London, committed to the Tower
by the House of Commons for contempt: he was remanded by the
Common Pleas.
See also furray's Case, 1 Wilson 299, where the King's Bench
refused to admit to bail one committed for contempt by the House
of Commons. The court said: "This court cannot admit to bail a
person committed for contempt in any other court in Westminster
Hall."
A very celebrated case, where a commitment by a superior court
was questioned, and the action of the court overruled by the discharge
of the prisoners, in contradiction of the rule laid down above, is
Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135 (1682).
This was a "most unconstitutional commitment of a jury" by
the Court of Oyer and Terminer, for contempt in acquitting certain persons, against the direction of the court, and against the law
and the evidence : (so stated in the order of the court as set forth
in the return), for which they were fined, and on non-payment,
imprisoned. The case came up on habeas corpus in the Common
Pleas, and the prisoners were discharged. The grounds for so
doing, as stated by VAUGHAN, C. J., were, 1, the generality of the
commitment, on which point his decision has since been restricted
to the case of commitments by inferior courts only: 2, that the
action of the jury in acquitting, as stated in the return, was no
cause of fine and imprisonment; this was most clearly and forcibly
set forth.
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Lord ELLENBOROUGH very probably had in mind this case (it
had been cited before him in the argument) in Burdett v. Abbot,
14 East 60-70, when he said, p. 150: "if a commitment appeared to be for a contempt of the House of Commons generally,
I would neither in the case of that court, or of any other of the
superior courts, inquire further; but if it did not profess to commit for a contempt, but for some matter appearing on the return,
which could by no reasonable intendment be considered as a contempt of the court committing, but a ground of commitment palpably and evidently arbitrary, unjust and contrary to every principle
of positive law or national justice, I say, that in the case of such
commitment, if it should ever occur, but which I cannot possibly
anticipate as ever likely to occur, we must look at it, and act upon
it as justice may require, from whatever court it may profess to
have proceeded." See this case discussed and qualified In re .ernandez, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 30, 32; People v. Kelley, 1 Am. Law
Reg. (N. S.) 546, note ad fin.
So extreme a case as Bushell's, and so gross an abuse of the
power of a court, can seldom if ever arise; should it do so, it is
hardly possible that a court before which such a judgment should
come, would do otherwise than follow the course indicated by Lord
ELLENBOROUGH.

In Rex v. Clement, 4 Barn. & Ald. 218 (6 E. C. L. Rep. 407)
(1821), the jurisdiction of a superior court came under examination. A rule to show cause and for a certiorari to the justices of
the delivery of the gaol of Newgate, had been admitted in the
King's Bench, the object being to bring up certain orders made by
the said justices, for violation of which the said Clement had been
fined by them.
The question of contempt or no contempt depended on the
validity of these orders, made by a.superior court. See In re Fernandez, 6 H. & N. 727.
HOLROYD, J.: " This was an order made in a proceeding over
which the court had judicial cognisance: the subject-matter respecting which it was made, was then in the course of judicature before
them. The object for which it was made was clearly, as it appears
to me, one within their jurisdiction." The judge also said if the
order imposing the fine was illegal, the party injured could make
his defence in the Court of Exchequer. Rule discharged.
In Carus Wilsan's Case, 7 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 1015 (1845), which
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was a habeas corpus in the Queen's Bench for a person imprisoned
for contempt by the Royal Court of Jersey, Lord DENMAN, C. J.,
says : "we must always feel most unwilling to interfere in such a
way, indeed the practice has almost been discontinued for a century." And on page 1008, it is an exception to "the whole law
of habeas corpus, whether under common law or statute, namely,
that our form of writ does not apply where a party is in execution
under the judgment of a competent court." "When a party has
been before a court of competent jurisdiction, which court has committed him for a contempt or any other cause, I think it is no
longer open to this court to enter at all into the subject-matter."
See also Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Burdett v Abbot, 14 East 150.
And the Court of Common Pleas in the Matter of A~ndrews,
4 Man., Gr. & Scott 225, declared that they had no power to discharge, on habeas corpus, a prisoner who had been committed for
contempt by the Court of Chancery, and could not entertain any
question as to the irregularity of such process.
In re Crawford, 13 Ad. & E. 613, which was a habeas corpus
in the King's Bench to the Court of Chancery of the Isle of Man.
the court said: "It is enough for us to see that the court has the
power, and that is clear law." In such case, the question if a
publication is contemptuous is for the court which commits, "as has
been said in many instances." We have not to inquire into this
matter, which has been adjudicated upon by a court of competent
jurisdiction ." p. 628. See, also, Rex v. Faulkner, 2 Mon. &
Ayr. Cases in Bankruptcy 311, 344.
In re Fernandez, 100 C. B. (N. S.) 3, was a motion for a
habeas corpus in the Common Pleas, in the case of a person committed for contempt by the Court of Assizes, in refusing to answer
as a witness. It was decided that the Court of Assizes was a
"superior" court, having as such full power to commit for contempt, and that, therefore, their warrant need not set forth the
facts of the contempt, but was sufficient if stating generally a
commitment for contempt. ERLE, C. J.: "It appears to me that
the warrant was made by a competent tribunal, in respect of a
matter within its jurisdiction, and that it is good upon the face of
it. We are not a court of review or a court of appeal :" p. 25.
The writ was refused. A similar motion had previously been made
in the Court of Exchequer, and negatived on the same ground:
see 6 I.. & N. 727.
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Powers of Superior Courts at Common Law in the United States.

In the United States two different views are held: the first is
in accordance with that above set forth, and which we have seen
to be the well-settled English doctrine. According to the other
(while the distinction between superior and inferior courts as laid
down above is recognised), so far as concerns the question if a
contempt has been committed, and how it is punishable, the unrestrained and unsupervised exercise of the power over contempts,
exclusive of and not subject to revision by any other court, belongs
only to the highest of the superior courts; the others of them,
which have been denominated " subordinate," to distinguish them
from inferior courts, being, like the inferior court, subject in this
respect to the control of the higher courts : ff.eLaughlin's Case,
5 W. & S. 273.
1st. American decisions following the English doctrine. Of
these one of the leading cases is -Ex varte Kearney, 7 Wheat.
38 (1822), in which STORY, J., citing and approving Brass Crosby's
Case, 3 Wils. 188, says, adopting the words :of Lord DE GREY,
C. J., "when a court commits a party for contempt, their adjudication is a conviction, and their commitment in consequence is
execution." So it is most apparent, "that a writ of habeas corpus
was not deemed a proper remedy where a party was committed for
contempt by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that if granted,
the court would not inquire into the sufficiency of the cause of
commitment."
This was a motion in the Supreme Court of the United States
for a writ of habeas corpus, in behalf of a person imprisoned for
contempt, by the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, in
refusing to answer as a witness: it was held that the court had
authority to issue the writ, where a person was imprisoned under
the warrant or order of any other court of the United States, but
that this was not a proper case for it.
The jurisdiction and authority of the court committing were
unquestioned. "The only objection is that it (the court) erred in
its judgment of the law applicable to the case." "This court has
no appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, by the laws of the
United States." Hence it could not revise the judgment of the
Circuit Court in this case, or set it aside and discharge the prisoner. The writ was denied,
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This decision rested on the ground that a punishment for contempt was like conviction and sentence for a criminal offence.
Nor will the Supreme Court of the United States interfere by a
mandamus, with the discretion of a district court, in regard to
striking off an attorney from its rolls for contempt, holding it to be
a matter not within their cognisance: MARSHALL, C. J., in _x
parte Tillinghast, 4 Pet. 108. But in a later case the Supreme
Court, though refusing a mandamus to restore an attorney so
stricken off, said, that their authority was doubtful, but whatever
it was would be exercised only when the conduct of the court
below had been "grossly irregular or flagrantly improper." "It
could only interpose, on the ground that the circuit court bad
clearly exceeded its powers or had decided erroneously on the
testimony :" Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529; s. c. 2 Cr. C. C. 379.
In Tennessee, although under the recent code, the supreme
court has revisory jurisdiction in case of contempt, it has been
held in the court of chancery that the court would not, on a bill
in equity, enjoin the chancellor of a county court from punishing
for contempt an officer of his court. "To concede that another
judge may enjoin such a judgment is to concede not merely the
power of revision, but that a judgment may be attacked by a new
suit instituted for the purpose, even when the court has jurisdiction both of the subject-matter and the person, a position in conflict with every principle of law :" Sanders v. 111etcalf, 1 Tenn.
Ch. 419 (1873).
Prior to Ex parte Kearney occurred the important case of
J. V. N. Yates, which came before the Supreme Court of the
state of New York, in 1809 (4 Johns. 317), went thence to the
Court of Errors and Appeals, which reversed the decision of
the Supreme Court, in 6 Johns. 337, came again into the Supreme
Court in another shape, in 5, Johns., was there decided in accordance with its previous opinion, in which the court was affirmed by
the Court of Errors and Appeals, which thus reversed its own
former action: see 9 Johns. 395.
Yates had been committed for a contempt by the Court of Chancery, discharged by a single judge of the Supreme Court on habeas
corpus, recommitted by the Court of Chancery, from which commitment he prayed to be delivered on habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court decided that the order of commitment, which set forth the act of contempt, was a good commitment;
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that it had no power to discharge a person committed by the Court
:f Chancery for a contempt; and that it would presume that the
proceedings of that court were legal, and that the conviction for
the contempt was on sufficient and legal evidence.
KENT, 0. J., in his opinion said there were many cases where
the Court of King's Bench, and some where the Common Pleas,
had, on habeas corpus, undertaken to examine and decide upon
the cause and the authority for the commitment by'another court,
and except in a few anomalous cases, they were all commitments
by inferior courts, citing the cases. "I apprehend that there is
not an instance in the English law of a judge in vacation, undertaking to decide upon the legality of a commitment in execution
by the judgment of any court of record, and much less of a court
of the highest degree :" p. 357-8. After citing at large from the
Lord Mayor's Case, he says, p. 372, "I have cited the opinion
of these judges much at large, because I could not hope to improve
upon the strength of their observations; and I entertain the most
perfect conviction that the law as they declared it in this case was
well understood and definitely established as part of the common
P
law of England at the time of our Revolution."
This opinion, as was said, was finally affirmed in the Court of
Errors and Appeals (9 Johns. 395), on the precise point decided,
namely, the power of a single judge to discharge a person committed by another court, and it would seem that the court were
also of opinion that the whole court had no more power in this
respect.
The case in 9 Johns. was an action for the penalty, under the
Habeas Corpus Act, by Yates against the chancellor.
It is interesting to observe the parallel between the action of
the Court of Errors and Appeals in their first decision of this
matter, and that of Lord COKE in the similar cases in the time of
James I. KENT, C. J., in the course of his opinion in 4 Johns.
369, says: "Lord COKE'S conduct in the cases in the time of
James I., where the King's Bench discharged persons on habeas
corpus, who were committed by the Court of Chancery for contempt, has been uniformly admitted to have been erroneous and
intemperate."
The doctrines of Yates's Case are still law in New York. If
the court has jurisdiction and the proceedings are in due form, and
the cause of the alleged contelhpt plainly set forth in the commitVOL. X=-.-38
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ment, as required by statute, the adjudication of the court as to the
contempt cannot be reviewed on habeais corpus or certiorari: JPeople v. Mitchell, 29 Barb. 6i22 ; 7 Abb. 1r. 96 ; 12 Id. 249 ; Matter of Perey, 2 Daly 530. An exception to the general rule is
established by People v. Kelly, 24 _N.Y. 74 (1861), a case to be
discussed hereafter.
By statute April 15th 1854 (vol. 5, stat. 133) such adjudications
may be examined on appeal, and before this statute the question
of the jurisdiction and regularity of proceedings of the committing
court had been considered on appeal in People v. Sturtevant, 5
Seld. 263.
Ex parte Kfearney's and Yates's Cases, have been cited and followed in a number of other cases now to be remarked on.
Among the most interesting of these is that of Passmore Williamson, 26 Penn. St. 9 (1855). This was an application to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for a writ of habeas corpus for one
committed by the United States District Court for contempt.
Although the case before the court being a commitment by an "independent," "co-ordinate" court, belonging " to a different judicial
system" and "responsible to a different sovereignty," is properly
an authority only with regard to tlhese conditions, and did not call
for so strong an expression of qpinion, BLACK, J., said "The
authority to deal with an offender of this class belongs exclusively
to the court in which the offence is committed, and no other court,
not even the highest, can interfere with its exercise, either by writ
of error, mandamus or habeas corpus," p. 18: "On a habeas corpus
the judgment even of a subordinate state court cannot be disregarded, reversed or set aside, however clearly we may perceive
it to be erroneous, and however plain it may be that we ought to
reverse it if it were before us on appeal or writ of error :" p. 17.
"It is most especially necessary that convictions for contempt in
one court, should be final, conclusive and free from re-examination
by other courts on habeas corpus. If the law were not so our
judicial system would break to pieces in a month :" p. 20, citing
Yates's, Kearney's and the Lord Mayor's Cases. This case
is distinguished in Commonwealth v. Newton, 1 Grant 453
not
(1857) infra, and as will be seen the law above laid down is
decisions.
other
by
qualified
as
except
that of Pennsylvania
In Vermont it has been said in Vilas v. Burton, 4 Am. Law
for conReg. 168 (1854), citing Yates's Case, that proceedings

CONTEMPT OF COURT.

tempt, when the court has jurisdiction, are not revisable in any
other. "There are no cases where such proceedings in the superior
court have ordinarily been held revisable, unless where the proceedings were so irregular as to be against law and to give the court no
proper jurisdiction :" p. 171.
In Kentucky the Supreme Court held that no writ of error or
appeal lay to an order punishing for a contempt by a county circuit court, a court of competent jurisdiction: Johnston v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb 598 (1809). But the doctrine of this case
was greatly modified, and it was held that the Court of Appeals,
though it would not retry the question of contempt, would correct
erroneous judgments and sentences : Bickley v. Commonwealth, 2
J. J. Marsh. 572 (1829). See also Patton v. Harris, 15 B. Mon.
607 (1855). These cases were followed in Ex parte Alexander, 2
Am. Law Reg. 44, which arose in the Louisville Chancery Court
in 1853, on a petition for a habeas corpus to be discharged from
imprisonment by order of a circuit court for contempt. The
Chancellor said: "This court cannot on habeas corpus deliver any
person lawfully committed by the Circuit Court for contempt,"
nor "inquire into the question of contempt." It was further held
that where the court had no jurisdiction or exceeded its power, the
person should be released on habeas corpus. Citing, among others
of the above cases, "the great and leading case of the Lord
Mayor of London."
The commitment in this case being "until further order of the
court," was held invalid, and the prisoner discharged. See also
Bickley v. Commonwealth, supra; compare Rex v. Clemcnt, 4 B.
& Ald. 218. The Chancellor further said: "On habeas corpus the
English courts have always looked into the authority by which a
man was imprisoned. They have declined to examine the merits
of the judgment on this writ, but only decide whether the court
had power to give that judgment." The Revised Statutes of
Kentucky, p. 215, say, "That no writ of error or appeal shall lie
from an order or judgment of any court punishing a contempt."
"This was the common law :" p. 49.
In Ex parte Nugent, in the Circuit Court of District of Columbia, 1848 (see 1 Am. Law J. (N. S.) 107), a case precisely analogous
to that of the Lord Mayor of London came up. It was a petition
for a habeas corpus for one committed for contempt before the
Senate of the United States in secret session. CRANCH, C. J., in
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his opinion followed very closely those of the judges in the Lord
Mayor's Case, which, he remarks, "as Mr. Justice STORY said in
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Kfearney's Case, settled the law upon that point," which he says
further, "has so continued down to the present day" (p. 117). The
court cited also the case of Anderson v. Duznn, 6 Wheat. 224,
remarking that there the judgment of the House of Representatives
committing for contempt came collaterally before the court, and
could be called in question, that being a suit against the sergeantat-arms where the commitment was pleaded as justification, while
here it came directly before the court on habeas corpus, and the
court, as in Crosby's Case, could not give relief without directly
assailing it. The prisoner was remanded.
In First Congregational Church v. 3Mruseatine, 2 Clarke (Iowa)
69 (1855), which was an appeal to the Supreme Court from an
order of a county district court discharging from an alleged contempt, the court, citing the Lord Mayor's, Ifearney's and rates's
Gase, State v. Tipton and Johnston v. Commonwealth, supra, say:
"These authorities are conclusive that in the absence of statute
law each court of record is the sole and final judge in matters of
contempt."
By sect. 1606 of the Code, "no appeal lies to an order to punish
for a contempt, but the proceedings may in proper cases be taken
to a higher court for review by certiorari." It was doubted if
certiorari lay to an order refusing to punish for contempt.
Jordan v. State, 14 Texas 436 (1855), was a case of commitment for contempt by a district court, a petition to the same court
for a habeas corpus, and an appeal to the Supreme Court from their
refusal to grant it. Ex parte Kearney was cited by the court, which
said: " Since an appeal will not lie in cases of contempt, neither
will the writ of habeas corpus lie to revise the action of the court
in punishing for contempt."
Under the statutes of Texas the judge has discretion to grant
the writ, and it should be refused when evident that the party
would not be entitled to his discharge, as "when he is detained for
a contempt of court." See also State v. Thurmond, 37 Texas
340. An exception has been established when the proceedings of
the committing court are so grossly defective as to be void; in such
case the Court of Appeals will discharge on habeas corpus: -7
parte Kilgore, 3 Texas App. 247 (1877).
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The High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi has
declared that under the common law and the constitution of the
3tate it had no jurisdiction to review the judgment of any inferior
court convicting of contempt. The court in this instance was not
of an "inferior order," but one of record-a probate court. The
Lord Mayor's, Kearney's, Yeates's Cases and Commonwealth v.
Johnston were followed: Watson v. Williams, 36 M ss. 331. But
if the court committing had no jurisdiction, its commitment would
be void: Shattuck v. State, 51 Miss. 50. There has been a
similar ruling in Alabama: .Exvarte Stickney, 40 Ala. 160. And
in Arkansas (see Cossart v. State, 14 Ark. 538), where it was held
that neither under the statutes nor at common law would a writ of
error or an appeal lie to an inferior court, even if it exceeded its
jurisdiction, in matters of contempt.
In Zlliddlebrook v. The State, 43 Conn. 257 (1876), a writ of
error was brought in the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment
of a court of common pleas fining and imprisoning for contempt.
The contempt was a gross one in presence of the court. The
Supreme Court, after a full examination of the facts, decided that
the court below had jurisdiction, that its proceedings were regular
and the sentence within its power, except as to a portion of it
putting costs on the prisoner, as well as a fine, which was reversed;
the rest of the judgment being affirmed. The portion reversed was
held not warranted by the statute limiting the fine imposed for contempt, which, so far as it was an enabling act, was pronounced to
be only declaratory of the common law. CARPENTER, J. : "The
questions involved in this case are mainly questions of jurisdiction;
therefore, it must not be regarded as a precedent, inducing the belief that in all proceedings for a contempt questions of law will be
reviewed by this court, as in other cases :" p. 267. In the argument, .Kearney'sand Williamson's Cases were cited and relied on.
The principle enunciated in this case was followed in Tyler et
al. v. Hamersley, 44 Conn. 393, which also was a writ of error in
the Supreme Court from a judgment of a superior court, imprisoning for a contempt. HoVEY, J. : "Upon this motion (to strike
off the writ of error from the docket), the question which at present presents itself is, whether a writ of error will lie upon an
adjudication of a contempt." "But at common law no writ of
error lies, except upon a judgment or an award in the nature of a
judgment." Then, after citing the case of The City of London,
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8 Rep. 383; Rex v. Dean of Dublin, 1 Stra. 536; 8 Mod. 27,
and some others, he says: "These cases arc sufficient to show that
at common law, adjudications of contempt by courts of competent
a court of error "
jurisdiction are final and cannot be reviewed in
"And the doctrine is strongly supported by numerous other aucases
thorities, English and American," enumerating most of the
on.
above commented
But the court distinguished the case before it, on the ground that
therein the question of contempt had been tried, "upon an issue
deof law tendered by the party moving in the proceeding," and
would
rule
the
fact
of
cided upon that issue. Had the issue been
seem to be the same. In such case the decision of the court may
posiproperly be reviewed in a higher one. As authority for this
and
(1859),
tion, the court relied on In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253
27,
Rex v. Dean, &e., of Dublin, 1 Stra. 536; s. c. 8 Mod.
not
admitting that the reasons are technical, but such as should
rule
be discarded, although they should not be taken to establish a
conof
cases
in
error
of
writs
for
way
the
open
of procedure to
tempt generally.
In re Cooper was a habeas corpus brought in a county court for
by
one imprisoned for non-payment of a fine for contempt inflicted
the
to
return
the
to
demurred
a justice of the peace; the relator
the
writ, which set forth the facts of the case, and was remanded by
before
came
then
case
the
court, on exceptions to whose judgment
the Supreme Court, which after examination of the facts decided
that the justice acted within his jurisdiction, and that his proceedings were regular. A justice's court was declared to be one of record.
It was held the issue of law raised was properly reviewable by the
Supreme Court under the statute of Vermont. But the court
affirmed the general principle that where the court has jurisdiction
its exercise in a legal and proper manner is not reviewable by
superior courts, and that this applies to justices of the peace,
whose courts in Vermont are courts of record.
Rex v. The Dean, &c., of Dublin, was a mandamus from the
King's Bench in Ireland, the return to which was adjudged insufficient, and the writ made peremptory, on which a writ of error was
taken in the King's Bench in England.
Here it was held that this was not properly a judgment, hence
that the writ of error would not lie; in the opinion it is said: "It
is against the nature of a writ of error to lie on any judgment,
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but in cases where an issue may be joined and tried, or where
judgment may be had upon a demurrer, and joinder in demurrer."
If the defendant had traversed the facts of the return, on which
traverse the other side could take issue or demurrer, the writ of
error would have been good.
In T yler v. famersley, supra, the Superior Court had awarded a
peremptory mandamus to which, before service thereof, the defendants had taken out a writ of error. Being advised by counsel that
this operated as a supersedeas to the mandamus, they disobeyed it.
To the answer to the petition for commitment for contempt the attorney for the state demurred; the court held the answer insufficient
and ordered the defendants imprisoned. To this judgment the writ
of error was taken. The Supreme Court held that, although by common law, which governed the case in Connecticut, no writ of error
lay on "award of a fine and imprisonment for contempt," yet in
this case the proceedings for contempt had not been according to
the form and rules of the common law, but the parties and the
court proceeded with the petition as if it had been an original writ;
the defendant in error, the attorney for the state, formally demurred
to the return, on which demurrer judgment was rendered, and on
such judgment a writ of error would lie at common law and in
Connecticut.
According to the law as laid down in this case, it would be in
the power of any one committed for contempt by a subordinate
court, to bring a writ of habeas corpus, demur to the return, and
after judgment of the court thereon, carry up the matter to an
appellate court; precisely this was done in Cooper's Case, 32 Vt.
253.
Grounded on the principle of these two cases, though not citing
their authority, is a decision of the Supreme Court of Maine in Androscoggin and Kennebec Railroad Co. v. Androscoggin Railroad
Co., 49 Maine 391 (1862). An injunction had been granted by
one of the judges of the Supreme Court, holding a county court,
the violation of which he adjudged to be a contempt, and the
Supreme Court held that such adjudication and rulings in matters
of contempt, where the question of jurisdiction of the proceeding
was "distinctly raised and adjudicated upon as matter of law,"
might be excepted to, and that the Supreme Court would revise
the proceedings on writ of error. This principle seems not recognised in any other case than those above commented on.

